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ABSTRACT. The last years have seen a surge of scandals
in financial intermediation. This article argues that the
agency structure inherent to most forms of financial inter-
mediation gives rise to conflicts of interest. Though this
does not excuse scandalous behavior it points out market
imperfections. There are four types of conflicts of interest:
personal-individual, personal-organizational, impersonal-
individual, and finally, impersonal-organizational conflicts.
Analyzing recent scandals we find that all four types of
conflicts of interest prevail in financial intermediation.
KEY WORDS: financial intermediation, conflict of
interests, principal-agent theory
Shortly after the turn of the millennium, a spate of
scandals cast a bad light on financial intermediation
and public concern was on the rise. In the U.S.,
business practices of financial intermediaries such as
insurance companies, mutual funds, investment
banks and others, and the conflicts on interests they
face came under investigation. In both the U.S. and
Europe, a series of accounting scandals erupted,
Enron and Parmalat probably being the most fa-
mous cases. Although accounting firms received the
major share of the blame, the fraud could not have
happened without the complicity of financial
intermediaries. These scandals led to the imple-
mentation of regulatory and legislative changes,
most prominently the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
Despite being of particular interest in recent years,
work on ethics in finance in general and conflicts
of interest in financial intermediation in particular is
still sparse. Although the last years have seen a surge
in both more theoretical (see e.g., Boatright, 2000,
1999; Crockett et al., 2004; Dobson, 1997, 1993;
Walter, 2003) and empirical work (see e.g.,
Kroszner and Strahan, 2001; Walter, 2006;
Zitzewitz, 2003), the literature is still only emerg-
ing. This article seeks to address this deficit on a
conceptual level, following Carson’s recent plea
that ‘‘work in business ethics should pay more
attention to conflicts of interest, especially the ways
in which conflicts of interest are ‘internal’ to pro-
fessional roles and pervade business and professional
life’’ (Carson, 2004: p. 179). Our article contributes
by clarifying and structuralizing the broad field of
conflicts of interest with reference to financial
intermediation.
According to Boatright (1999: p. 5f), ethics in
finance concerns the financial services industry as
well as financial markets and financial management.
However, the following discussion is limited to
financial intermediation, provided by the financial
services industry and financial markets and their
related institutions. These are especially prone to
structural conflicts of interest as will be illustrated in
the following. While Thielemann and Ulrich
(2003) propose to differentiate between contractual
and non-contractual fields of ethical responsibility
in the financial sector, our study looks at the
responsibilities that arise in contractual relationships
between the financial intermediary and its client(s)
and the conflicts that are specific to that
relationship.1
The rest of the article is organized as follows. (a)
Since our analysis of conflicts of interests in financial
intermediation builds upon a contractual principal
agent relationship, we will begin by introducing the
principal agent paradigm. (b) This section is followed
by a description of the main actors in financial
intermediation. We then propose a structure for the
analysis of conflicts of interest and advance examples
from recent financial scandals. (c) The concluding
section gives a short overview of possible solution
mechanisms.
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The principal agent paradigm as context of
analysis
A financial intermediary goes between the users
and suppliers of financial resources (Carmichael
and Pomerleano, 2002), a relationship that can be
modeled as a principal agent relationship. The
financial intermediary (the agent) acts on behalf of
its client (mostly dispersed, uninformed investors –
the principal) without risking its own assets. Its
superior knowledge allows it to act more effi-
ciently and to save costs (e.g., transaction and
information costs through specialized technical
knowledge and economies of scale). Principal and
agent enter a contractual relation in which the
intermediary provides certain services – such as
transaction and fiduciary services but also advisory
and management services – to its client. These
services are more or less concretely specified. In
return, the client pays the intermediary a fee
which might follow a fixed rate or depend on the
intermediary’s performance.
The model assumes that the principal has an
information deficit compared to the agent. Their
interests might differ substantially. The agent is
usually modeled as a self-interested individual who is
trying to maximize profit (see Jensen and Meckling,
1976 for a detailed discussion of the concept). There
are three types of problems according to the model:
hidden action, hidden knowledge, and hidden
information. The first implies that the principal is
not able to fully observe the agent’s actions and
cannot be perfectly monitored (at least not without
costs). This might give way to moral hazard on the
agent’s side. It is not possible to completely specify
the contract between principal and agent as not all
states of nature are to be fully known ex ante. This
problem is aggravated by the fact that there might be
information about the contractual environment
which is known to the agent but not to the principal
(hidden information). The last problem is that of
hidden knowledge: some features (e.g., the other
clients, compensation scheme of the employees etc.)
– or more generally the incentive structure – of the
agent are not fully known to the principal and the
agent per se has no incentive to disclose them.
Building upon this concept of principal-agent
theory, we propose two modifications for the
application to financial intermediation.
Modification 1, professional ethics
The relationship between intermediary and client in
financial intermediation goes beyond the general
principal agent relationship that for instance exists
between a manager within a corporation and the
owner of a corporation. The agents customarily are
held with the legal authority and duty to make
decisions regarding financial matters on the clients’
behalf. Safeguarding the clients’ assets, the financial
intermediary has a custodian role with broader
public implications. Therefore, it has been argued
that professionals in financial intermediation have
professional duties in this agency relationship
equaling those of, for example, accountants, lawyers,
and medical staff. The three features characterizing a
profession are, according to Boatright (1999: p. 42),
(i) a specialized body of knowledge (ii) a high degree
of organization and self-regulation, and finally (iii) a
commitment to public service. He comes to the
conclusion that although the pursuit of self-interest is
more prevailing in financial intermediation, it still
requires a special professional ethics due to its fidu-
ciary function. Boatright (1999: p. 6) subsumes the
obligations of financial intermediaries under the
following: ‘‘The main duties of professionals are to
perform services with competence and due care, to
avoid conflicts of interest, to preserve confidential-
ity, and to uphold the ideals of the profession’’.
Thus, the agency relationship is intensified by a
special trust structure.
Modification 2, increased number of principals
Standard principal-agent theory was developed to
address the problem of diverging interests of the
principal and its agent. However, in the case of
financial intermediation it is not only the problem of
opposing personal interests. There are many cases in
which the agent has to act for two principals with
possibly diverging if not opposing interests
(Bernheim and Whinston, 1986). Thus, it requires
some modifications of basic principal-agent theory.
The principal can no longer be modeled as a unitary
actor. There are two cases that can be distinguished.
In the first, the agent sells the same kind of service to
different clients. In the second, different kinds of
services are offered to different clients. The agent
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faces a problem of how to weigh the different if not
opposing interests of the principals and accordingly,
how to best act in the interest of all clients.
The landscape of financial intermediation –
actors and activities
Traditionally, capital markets are viewed as means of
an efficient allocation of capital in matching capital
suppliers (lenders) and users (borrowers). However,
capital markets are far from being perfect and thus
financial intermediaries are needed to improve the
efficiency of capital allocation, for instance by
reducing information and/or transaction costs or by
creating liquidity (French and Leyshon, 2004). Yet,
financial intermediaries as profit-making organiza-
tions are more than neutral go-betweens. In the
following, the landscape of financial intermediation
will be outlined and general characteristics of the
actors will be depicted. Figure 1 gives a schematic
overview of the agency structure of financial inter-
mediation.
We distinguish between three types of financial
intermediaries: institutional investors, ‘pure inter-
mediaries´ such as brokers and investment banks, and
commercial banks. These institutions have a differ-
ent standing in financial intermediation.
Institutional investors are relatively close to indi-
vidual investors (or other institutional investors)
and usually do not directly interact with the users
of capital (with the exception of venture funds,
which invest directly in companies).2 Institutional
investors aggregate funds from a number of other
investors (such as individuals, corporations, gov-
ernments, and other institutional investors) and
manage them professionally on their behalf. Insti-
tutional investors, operating with large amounts of
money, allow smaller investors to better diversify
risk, a process which is termed ‘portfolio trans-
formation’ (French and Leyshon, 2004: p. 268).
Besides, as operating on an economies of scale
basis, institutional investors help to reduce trans-
action costs (especially trading but also information
costs and other costs). They usually make a profit
by charging a fee. A defining characteristic is that
the risk is still borne by the investor which gives
the manager a fiduciary role, acting as an agent in
the transactions (Carmichael and Pomerleano,
2002). The following analysis will concentrate on
one class of institutional investors in particular,
that of mutual funds. In contrast to mutual funds,
pension funds as the second most prominent group
of institutional investors are heavily regulated if
not even managed by public sector entities. Their
specific situation gives rise to special problems
which we will not address in our article. A mutual
fund raises money by selling shares to investors
who receive an equity position in the fund and in
each of its underlying securities. The fund invests
into a group of assets as it is stated by the terms
stipulated in the trust deed. The money raised is
invested by the fund into a wide range of assets,
such as shares, bonds, derivatives, and money
market instruments. Typically, shareholders are
free to sell their shares at any time, although the
price of a share in a mutual fund fluctuates daily,
depending upon the performance of the assets held
by the fund. The relationship between mutual
fund company and investors equals a trust struc-
ture.3 Above all, their design as long-term savings
vehicles gives mutual funds special obligations to-
ward their investors/principals and the wider
public in general. However, institutional investors
also act as principals insofar as they give orders to
brokers and investment banks.
Brokers and investment banks are pure intermediar-
ies inasmuch as they serve to reduce information and
transaction costs without transforming the asset class
(French and Leyshon, 2004). Investment banks and
brokers mediate between buyers and sellers of
securities (bonds and shares), the former on the
primary market (floating of shares and debt under-
writing), the latter on secondary markets (where
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Figure 1. The agency structure: capital suppliers –
financial intermediation – capital users.
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assets are resold and repurchased). An investment
bank acts as an underwriter and thus an agent for
corporations and governments issuing securities. In
addition, they might facilitate mergers and acquisi-
tions, private equity placements and corporate
restructuring. They do not have the custodian role
of traditional banks or asset managers, but instead
certain other obligations toward their clients as, e.g.,
confidentiality. A broker maintains markets for
previously issued securities. Thus, whereas invest-
ment banks come from the side of the corporation
and should try to make the best deal for their cor-
porate clients (i.e., raising capital to attain the lowest
costs), brokers trade on the secondary market and
should execute transactions by making the best deals
for investors (individual and institutional). Fre-
quently, both give additional advisory services to
their clients and both functions (underwriting/
investment banking and broking) are localized in
one entity.
Commercial banks accept deposits and make loans
thus mediating between borrowers and lenders
(Valdez and Wood, 2003). Like institutional inves-
tors they transform portfolios by pooling savings for
many small depositors and diversifying risk in lend-
ing to different institutions and with different
maturities. While pure intermediaries act in a rather
anonymous context commercial banks tend to build
longer-standing relationships (in their role as
depository intermediaries as well as lenders). On the
one hand, commercial banks have a fiduciary role
toward their depositors. Freixas and Rochet (1997)
point out that – as they have only a limited
knowledge of the safety of financial institutions –
depositors have to be protected. Banks are meant to
overcome imperfect information on borrowers,
especially by screening and monitoring loans. On
the other hand, commercial banks provide loans to
corporations and governments and charge a pre-
mium for this service.
The above is only a rough sketch of the agency
structure(s) in financial intermediation. In reality the
picture is often more complex with many more actors
involved. However, as has become apparent even in
this simplistic model, a modification of the traditional
principal-agent model is justifiable on the grounds of
the diverse relationships in financial intermediation.
In the next part, we will turn our attention to conflicts
of interest in this setting.
A categorization of conflicts of interest
Having outlined the basic principal-agent theory and
its modifications requisite to apply it to financial
intermediation and having described the landscape of
financial intermediation we will now turn to char-
acterizing the types of conflicts of interest that might
or do occur between and within the actors depicted
above. To streamline the following discussion,
problems which are not specific to the financial
industry are left out. This would be, for instance,
conflicts of interest in the shareholder – board of
directors relationship or the design of ‘‘ethical
products’’ (as e.g., socially and ecologically respon-
sible investment in case of financial services).
We will focus on problems in financial interme-
diation that have come up over the last years and add
illustrating examples from the recent spate of
financial scandals. Our choice of incidents is ad hoc,
based on U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
press releases since the 2000 end of stock market
boom and media coverage. However, the foremost
aim is to show what types of conflicts of interest
systematically prevail in financial intermediation.
Conflicts of interest are most prone to appear in
unregulated areas, tempting individuals and organi-
zations to exploit loopholes. But as recent corporate
scandals show, even in heavily regulated industries
such as financial services, they do happen. Modifi-
cation 1 of the principal-agent model gives rise to
conflicts of interest in this relationship as the pro-
fessional, in this case fiduciary, function of the agent
puts her into a position which she can exploit for her
own benefit, the textbook definition of conflict of
interest (see, e.g., Moore et al., 2006). However,
this simple definition hardly does justice to the
complexities of conflicts of interests built into the
structure of financial intermediation. First of all, it
does not differentiate between the existence of a
conflict of interest and its exploitation. Second, its
characterization of the agent is too vague. Is it the
individual professional? Is it the organization she
represents and with which the principal most
probably has contracted? And third, how do we
account for situations in which the agent does not
simply pursue her personal gain? Thus, a more sys-
tematic, polydimensional approach is required.
Boatright (2000: p. 202) defines a conflict of interest
as a situation in which ‘‘a personal or institutional
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interest interferes with the ability of an individual
or institution to act in the interest of another party,
when the individual or the institution has an ethical
or legal obligation to act in that other party’s
interest’’. In the context of the financial services
industry, he regards three forms of conflict of interest
as relevant:
(1) Actual versus potential conflicts of interest.
There are situations in which conflicts of
interest are built into the structure of the
system, in other words, unavoidable (poten-
tial). But it is the concrete misconduct of a
person or an organization that turns the sys-
temic/systematic potential into a real act
against fiduciary duties (actual).
(2) Individual versus organizational conflicts of
interest. An individual conflict of interest is
due to a professional’s personal behavior,
whereas an organizational conflict of interest
is due to organizational structure. As a gen-
eral rule, the more functions an organization
performs, the higher the potential for con-
flicts of interest it entails (Walter, 2003). In
the end, it also is the question of who is the
agent, e.g., the person in charge of the ac-
count or the organization as a whole.
(3) In regard to the modified version of the
principal-agent model discussed above, the
most important distinction Boatright makes
is that between personal versus impersonal
conflicts of interest. Exploitation of conflicts
of interest is often provoked by the individ-
ual gains it promises to individual profes-
sionals or organizations, as Carson, 2004: p.
162) puts it, ‘‘the temptations to do what
we know will violate our duties to other
parties’’. This is in accord with Latham’s
claim that ‘‘a person [or organization] has a
conflict of interest when, in the presence of
some duty to pursue the interest of another,
she is motivated by self-interest to do some-
thing inconsistent with this duty’’ (as quoted
in Carson, 2004, p. 163). Thus, personal
conflicts of interest occur in the pursuit of
self-interest which conflicts with the obliga-
tions as agent, the classical situation of the
principal-agent model. Yet, while personal
conflicts of interest relate to principal-agent
conflicts, impersonal conflicts can be under-
stood as arising from principal-principal
conflicts, the second modification of the
standard principal-agent model discussed
above. Impersonal conflicts of interest occur
if agents are confronted with conflicting
interests of different principals to whom
they provide different or similar kinds of
services. In other words, conflicting interests
of the principals give rise to a conflict of
interest for the agent. Thus, again, this type
of conflict of interest is rooted in the struc-
ture of the system.4
Boatright argues (2000) that most conflicts of interest
in the financial service industry are potential instead
of actual. Despite the recent corporate scandals, real
misconduct can be regarded as the exception. We
will start the following analysis with the latter two
aspects, personal/impersonal and individual/organi-
zational in order to reconstruct the different possible
forms of conflicts of interest that occur in the
financial services industry along the latter two dif-
ferentiations made by Boatright. We will come back
to the actual/potential aspect in our concluding
discussion on the transition from legal/moral to
illegal/immoral behavior along individual or orga-
nizational conditions and possible forms of preven-
tion.
Cross-classifying the categories personal/imper-
sonal and individual/organizational leads us to con-
sider the following four combinations of conflicts of
interest: (a) personal-individual, (b) impersonal-
individual, (c) personal-organizational, and finally
(d) impersonal-organizational (Table I). While
Boatright (2000) assumes that most conflicts of
interest in financial services are impersonal and
organizational, we will demonstrate on the basis of
recent scandals that all four conflicts systematically
prevail in financial intermediation.
Personal-individual conflict
Conflicts of interest can arise from personal trading. As
a matter of fact, personal trading has given rise to a
series of misconducts over recent years, ranging from
price manipulations over false statements to misuse
of sensitive information. However, in this discussion
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we want to concentrate on two cases that occur
within a principal agent relationship (between client
and financial intermediary), self-dealing of mutual
fund managers and broker insider trading. Given the
huge amounts of money they invest, mutual fund
managers influence the prices of assets by trading on
behalf of the fund or even by the mere public
announcements by which they recommend assets or
caution about them. Self-dealing in these assets
might induce managers to put their own interests
above that of the fund’s investors. Therefore, it can
be qualified as a personal-individual conflict. Yet,
problems with personal trading also arise within
other financial intermediaries as is the case, for in-
stance, when a broker not only executes trades for
his clients but also on his own behalf on information
from clients.
The heavy regulation of financial services and in
particular brokerage and mutual fund activities
might reduce, but cannot preclude the occurrence of
personal-individual conflicts of interest. In 2006, the
SEC filed for settled enforcement action against
Broker-Dealer Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co.
for unlawful insider trading (SEC Press Release
2006-214). In the same year, Morgan Stanley was
charged with failure to maintain and enforce policies
to prevent misuse of inside information (SEC Press
Release 2006-103). Goldman Sachs and Merril
Lynch are two other investment banks where per-
sonnel was involved in insider trading (SEC Press
Release 2006-53). In a high profile case, the SEC
brought enforcement actions against Putnam
Investment Management, one of the largest mutual
fund companies in the U.S.A., and two of its man-
aging directors for self-dealing in 2003 (CBS-
news.com, 2003; SEC Press Release 2003-142).
These incidences also indicate that current (SEC)
regulation does not always successfully prevent the
exploitation of conflicts of interest. Another kind of
personal-individual conflict of interest can exist in
the relationship between underwriter and municipal
government client and is often referred to as yield
burning, a practice which came to the attention of the
U.S. regulatory authorities in the mid-1990s fore-
most because of tax reasons (Dodd, 2003). Yield
burning occurs when underwriters in advance ref-
undings impose markups on tax-exempt U.S.
Treasury bonds deposited to compensate investors
after the refunding bonds have been issued. The
markup can divert money away from the munici-
pality into the pockets of the underwriter, the
exploitation of a typical personal-individual conflict
of interest. In a global settlement with the SEC in
April 2000, seventeen brokerage firms agreed to pay
more than $139 million (SEC Press Release 2000-
45). In addition, more than $18 million were to be
paid directly to municipalities. Again, some of the
biggest investment banks were involved.
Another kind of personal-individual conflict of
interest that arises from IPO activities is laddering.
Laddering describes investment bank’s or investment
bankers’ efforts to motivate clients to buy IPO shares
in the first days of trade (the after market that
immediately follows the IPO) by promising prefer-
ential treatment in the share allocation of future
IPOs, thus making the IPO a bigger success. In the
recent wave of financial scandals, Morgan Stanley,
for instance, has been found to be involved in lad-
dering with some of its most important investment
clients (Smith, 2003). Laddering, it seems, has be-
come a widespread practice. A litigation on ladder-
ing at the New York stock exchange includes more
TABLE I
Categorization of conflicts of interest according to principal-agent model
Conflict of interest Individual Organizational
Personal Arises in the relationship
between individual professional
and her principal.
Arises in the relationship between
(multi-purpose) organization and principal.
Impersonal Arises from the conflicting interests
of principals faced by the individual
professional.
Arises from the conflicting interests
of principals faced by the (multi-purpose)
organization.
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than 50 investment banks and 309 IPOs between
1998 and 2000 (Chavous et al., 2004). Laddering is a
personal-individual type of conflict of interest as this
fraudulent behavior benefits the organization if not
even single employees without deceiving other cli-
ents with which the investment bank has a (current)
contractual relationship.
Impersonal-individual conflict
Especially since 2003, attention has turned to
problems in the mutual fund industry as recent
financial scandals centered around market timing and
late trading practices (Economist, 2003b; SEC Press
Releases 2000-2007). Both forms of conflict have
their roots in the fund industry’s convenience of
evaluating fund shares. Prices of fund shares usually
are fixed once a day, in the U.S. at 4 p.m. New
York time. As the underlying assets are more vola-
tile, the prices of the fund and its underlying assets
might differ throughout the day. Market timing
refers to the practice of buying and selling fund
shares very rapidly, thus taking advantage of short-
term fluctuations in the fund’s underlying portfolio
(e.g., by reacting to information from foreign mar-
kets that is not taken into account by pricing the
fund’s shares). These activities are opposed to a
mutual fund’s design as a long-term investment
vehicle as they force it to remain more liquid than it
would otherwise be, reducing its performance. As
Mahoney (2004: p. 174) emphasizes, it is mainly the
‘‘deliberate attempt to exploit stale prices […that]
defines ‘improper´ market timing’’. Zitzewitz (2003)
estimates that market timing leads to losses of about
USD 5 billion for ordinary, long-term investors per
year. Condoning market timing has turned out to be
expensive for mutual funds. Settlements reached
with the SEC are often in the eight-digit range if not
even higher. In an extraordinary case, Prudential
agreed to pay $600 million to settle fraud charges in
connection with deceptive market timing of mutual
funds (SEC Press Release 2006-145).
Allowing favored investors to trade after the new
fixing of the price but at the previous conditions, is
called late trading and usually illegal. However, in
more than a third of cases it went hand in hand with
market timing, done by some larger investors with
the support of fund management (SEC Press
Releases 2003-February 2007). These practices
usually occur as a favor to big (i.e., mostly other
institutional) clients, damaging small investors. Thus,
clients with different bargaining power are treated
differently. These conflicts of interest are imper-
sonal-individual in so far as it were mostly single
professionals participating in the agreements (and
does not relate to organizational structure) though it
was usually condoned if not encourage by organi-
zations.
A third example of impersonal-individual con-
flicts is spinning. Spinning describes the practice of
investment banks to distribute highly sought after
shares among preferential clients, to attract future
underwriting business. Credit Suisse First Boston
and others have been involved in a recent scandal of
spinning, offering corporate executives preferred
access to shares in IPOs in hopes of getting some
investment banking business in return (Smith et al.,
2003). In 2002, it took CSFB $100 million to settle
these charges (SEC Press Release 2002-14). Solo-
mon offered Bernard Ebbers, the former CEO of
WorldCom Inc., a preferred access to a widely
oversubscribed telecommunication IPO in 1999.
Ebbers sold the shares within days and made a profit
of more than $11 million. WorldCom Inc. at that
time was an investment banking client of Solomon
(Craig, 2002). This conflict of interest is impersonal-
individual in so far as that preferential treatment was
given to certain clients above others to increase the
firm’s future profits. Firms sued for abusive or
unlawful IPO practices over the last years include
Morgan, Stanley, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan and
CSFB, again some of the industry’s best and bravest.
Personal-organizational conflict
Conflicts of interest can occur in the context of fund
share evaluation or the cost structure of a fund and
the investor-mutual fund-broker relationship. Fees
and expense ratios are not always disclosed in detail
which leaves the investor ignorant of the amount
paid for the fund’s management. This allows fund
management to bundle commissions and to pay for
the trades executed by stockbrokers with soft com-
missions. Those are payments to brokers in exchange
for research and other services besides trade execu-
tion, including trading or information systems and
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preferential treatment in initial public offerings
whose costs are passed on to the clients (Schwartz
and Steil, 2002). Instead of adding them to the
management fees, they show up in a lower perfor-
mance of the fund, thus giving a more competitive
picture of the fund’s fee structure. Similarly, directed
brokerage, giving trades to preferred brokers can en-
sure preferential treatment of (certain) mutual funds.
Another frequent misconduct are payments for shelf-
space, the use of both hard payments and directed
brokerage to secure heightened visibility of funds’
products within a brokerage’s distribution networks
(from the broker’s perspective, this type of conflict
of interest could also be classified as impersonal-
individual as certain clients are treated better than
others to increase revenues). In a settlement with the
SEC, Morgan Stanley, charged with inadequate
disclosure in mutual fund sales by receiving this kind
of payment from mutual funds, paid $50 million in
November 2003 (SEC Press Release 2003-159). A
few months later, MFS paid a penalty of $50 million
for its shelf-space arrangements with brokerage firms
(SEC Press Release 2004-44). Recent findings show
that even after subtracting the costs of ‘soft’ services,
trading costs are higher than necessary which might
be acerbated by the fund manager’s incentive to
increase the frequency of trades (Schwartz and Steil,
2002: p. 45). This type of conflict is personal-orga-
nizational as it is caused by the profit-making aims of
the fund management, embedded in the organiza-
tional structure of soft payments.
Analysts’ research is another source of personal-
organizational conflict of interest. In April 2003,
shortly before the mutual fund scandals erupted, 10
big Wall Street investment banks settled with the
SEC and other U.S. regulators by paying USD
1.4 billion (SEC Press Release 2003-54). Charges
were inadequately supervised research and invest-
ment operations (Economist, 2003a). Star analysts
such as Jack Grubman of Solomon and Henry
Blodget of Merril Lynch were accused of being in-
volved in fraudulent research reports and barred
from the securities industry (SEC Press Release
2003-55; 2003-56). Within Merrill Lynch e-mail
traffic documented that analysts called stock ‘crap’
and ‘junk’ internally but praised it externally
(Frieswick, 2002). At the same time, Morgan Stanley
was accused for having built too strong incentive
links between investment business and the research
department (Smith et al., 2003). For misleading
investors through dubious research, Morgan Stanley
paid $125 million for settling the charges (Solomon,
2003). These are only some of the charges that have
been brought up in the last few years. To be able to
give advisory services, these institutions often rely on
their internal research departments. This structure
provides for conflicts: analysts’ research, especially
their earnings forecasts might be influenced by their
desire to attract investment banking clients. This
problem in reality has been acerbated by wrong
incentives laid out in the compensation structure.
Analysts’ bonuses in many cases used to depend on
the overall performance of the firm, or even worse,
on underwriting profit. In fact, Chan et al. (2003)
find that analysts´ earnings forecasts are influenced by
their desire to attract investment banking clients.
However, they add that this effect is mitigated in
international markets. This is a personal-organiza-
tional type of conflict of interest that is inherent in
the firm’s organizational structure. Analysts might
have access to insider information due to their firm’s
involvement in investment banking procedures and
exploit this knowledge for their organization’s profit
(or their own via the mechanism of compensation
schemes).
Impersonal-organizational conflict
Connected lending describes a conflict of interest in the
context of a commercial bank’s function of accept-
ing deposits and making loans. This signifies that
banks are simultaneously lenders and borrowers,
which is a potential source for conflict of interest in
itself. However, in many cases they assume addi-
tional functions such as monitoring the loans granted
and advisory services to debtors. This might result in
having a position in the board of the debtor com-
pany, a case that is referred to as connected lending.
Those board connections provide an area of conflict.
Though they help monitoring (and reducing the
costs of information), the lending policy might be-
come biased as connected loans might be treated
more favorably (e.g., by better conditions for rolling
over debts). It is a impersonal-organizational type of
conflict of interest in two respects. On the one hand,
corporate clients are given preferential treatment
over depositors. This conflict is due to the different
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services a bank provides. The monitoring efficiency
argument does not hold in cases where connected
lending leads to sup-optimal debt recovery policies
as, for example, holding on to bad borrowers. On
the other hand, among the borrowers, those with
board connections are favored. Kroszner and Strahan
(2001) find that board linkages are frequent in the
U.S. However, they conclude that there is sufficient
regulation to avoid potential conflicts of interest in
the U.S.A. as opposed to the situation in countries
with weaker financial regulation. However, as we
have demonstrated in the discussion above, regula-
tion does not always help to prevent the exploitation
of conflicts of interest.
Table II reflects the types of conflict that occur
along our proposed matrix. Having dealt with those
sub-entities in financial intermediation the reader
might ask what happens in the case of universal
banking and financial conglomerates. Roughly de-
fined in this context, a universal bank unites all the
above-characterized roles and functions and more.
Consequently, it provides a vast field for (potential)
conflicts of interest in its organizational structure.
However, most of the concrete problems that are to
arise have already been discussed related to the other
intermediaries. Thus, we will not analyze universal
banking separately (for more detailed information
about conflicts of interest in universal banks and a
regulatory history of universal banking in the U.S.
we refer to Crockett et al., 2004).
As this discussion has shown, conflicts of interest
in financial intermediation are systemic. Therefore,
as Boatright argues (2000, p. 2001), the challenge ‘‘is
not to prevent conflicts of interest in financial
services but to manage them in a workable financial
system’’. In order to manage them, one must be
capable of understanding them. Our categorization
might serve to clarify the characteristics of the forms
of conflict that prevail. By unfolding the individual
and organizational roots behind the various forms of
conflict of interest, the categorization may help to
develop strategies to cope with the unavoidable risks
of their exploitation. We will conclude our article by
a short discussion on the third form of conflicts of
interest, actual and potential conflicts of interest.
Keeping potential conflicts potential – the
driving forces of ethical decision-making
Trevino (1996) has argued that ethical decision-
making has to be analyzed along individual and
organizational/situational lines. This resonates with
our own analysis. As we have argued in the above
discussion, there are two major roots of conflicts of
interest: those for which the standard principal agent
paradigm applies and those arising in a slightly
modified setting with two or more principals. In the
latter case, agents are tempted to better serve the
interests of some of their principals than others. This
may lie in the individual interest of the intermediary
or one of its employees or be due to the organiza-
tional structure.
Conflicts of interest are inherent in the system.
While the exploitation of conflicts of interest can be
criticized, their mere existence can neither be con-
demned per se nor be avoided without great diffi-
culty or negative side effects for the efficiency of
TABLE II
Types of conflicts of interest




Yield burning Directed brokerage/Improper
marketing arrangements/ ‘‘Shelf space’’
payments
Laddering Analyst research
Impersonal Market timing Connected lending
Late trading
IPO allocation practices/Spinning
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financial intermediation. Individuals and organiza-
tions alike have to make their own judgments to find
ways to cope with the potential transition from
potential to actual conflicts of interest. Generally, a
deeper understanding of conflicts of interest depends
on sufficient insights into the various dimensions
that influence ethical and unethical decision-making.
If the assumption is true that these conflicts cannot
be avoided, the question remains of how actors that
are confronted with such a conflict make their
decision and how the ethicality of these decisions
can be improved. What can be done to deal with the
systemic compliance and integrity threats that are,
for instance, linked to asymmetric information or
bargaining power? What provokes the actual mis-
conduct of and within organizations?
Bazerman et al. (1998) have discussed conflicts of
interest as competing internal preferences. Actors are
torn between something they want to do and some-
thing they should do. Such a conflict between interests
and values seems to be of particular relevance in per-
sonal conflicts of interest: An agent has to choose be-
tween her interest and a duty toward her principal.
Impersonal conflicts of interest seem to follow a dif-
ferent logic. Since they describe a principal-principal
dilemma, they seem to emerge from conflicting duties
with unclear priorities. Adopting the argument of
Bazerman et al. (1998) there seem to be divergent
‘‘shoulds’’ at stake. Badaracco (1997) has argued that
in such a dilemma, values collide with values.
How do actors behave in these two different types
of conflict of values against interest and values against
values? One alternative is to answer this question by
referring to characteristics of the individual. As Solo-
mon has for instance argued, the integrity of indi-
vidual decision-making depends on the ability to
perceive one’s action as embedded in an overarching
normative context (1993). The ability of such a
communitarian thinking depends on the individual
virtuousness (Caza et al., 2004) and is expressed in the
individual ability of moral reasoning (Solomon,
1993). Weber has followed this assumption in his
adoptation of Kohlbergs model of moral development
in managerial decision-making (Weber, 1991).
Within such a concept, actors get corrupted because of
their character. They are ‘bad apples in the (otherwise
good) barrel’ that give priority to self-interest. How-
ever, such an approach is limited for at least two rea-
sons. First, it does not help to explain (and manage)
impersonal conflicts. Second, it does not explain, why
good managers do bad things. As Badaracco and
Webb (1995) have for instance shown, young man-
agers often feel pressured to act unethically. This does
not necessarily come from their own preferences but
rather from organizational pressure. Zimbardo’s
prison experiments from the 1970s clearly demon-
strate that good people might do evil things if they are
put in an evil context (Zimbardo, 2004, 2007). In this
case, it seems to be the rotten barrel that influences the
quality of the apples. When Zimbardo asked average
students to roleplay prisoners and guards, they started
to behave and to feel like prisoners and guards.
Greenberg (1993) examined the immoral behavior
paradox which is based on moral reasoning: The
perception of being treated unfairly is used as a means
of justifying striking back or rebalancing giving and
taking (see also Blader and Tyler, 2003). Furthermore,
intercultural differences are important for the under-
standing of conflicts of interests. This is especially
important for situations, where actors perceive a col-
lision of values. In a communitarian society, where
individuals are embedded in strong networks of
obligations and relationships (Jackson, 2000) the
decisions made will probably differ from those made
by individuals in a more individualistic cultural con-
text. While individualistic societies operate with a
universal approach to ethical dilemmas (Hampden-
Turner and Trompenaars, 1993), actors with strong
perceptions of communitarian obligations might have
less difficulties to give illegal advantages to members of
their ingroups. On the contrary, a special treatment
because of strong social ties might even be an expec-
tation of the investors. The level playing field that is
important for individualistic societies might be con-
sidered as unethical in communitarian societies.
These different findings show that unethical
behavior might depend on the design of the context
and/or the perception of the context by the actor.
Contextual factors, therefore, might influence indi-
vidual decision-making in two forms. First, organi-
zations might create a context, in which unethical
behavior is promoted and agents give preference to
their own interests over their duties toward principals.
Such an effect might for instance be provoked by re-
ward systems (James, 2000; Jansen and Von Glinow,
1985) or by the behavior of the leaders (e.g., Dickson
et al., 2001). Second, organizations might create a
context, in which colliding ‘‘shoulds’’ are not clearly
202 Guido Palazzo and Lena Rethel
managed. Organizations have been analyzed as net-
works of shared meaning with meaning being trans-
mitted through the ‘‘use of a common language and
everyday social interaction’’ (Walsh and Ungson,
1991: 60, see also Smircich and Stubbart, 1985). If the
shared mental frames do not dispose of a non-ambi-
gious interpretations of conflicts of interest, if there are
no clear rules of how to deal with diverging duties,
norms and loyalities, employees are exposed to a high
ethical ambivalence (Jansen and Von Glinow, 1985).
Of course, corporations unavoidably operate in
ambivalent contexts with contradictory interpreta-
tions of reality (Weick, 1995). But if roles and
responsibilities are not clearly defined, there is a high
risk of bad behavior that results from a too narrow
interpretation of situations. The ambivalence might
result from a lack of imagination of the leaders within
the organization (who might change the level of
ambivalence) or from the intention to motivate
employees to walk the thin line between legal and
illegal as in the case of Enron.
Therefore, corporate integrity does not solely
depend on its numerous actors’ correct ethical
decision-making at all hierarchical levels. It fur-
thermore depends on the design of the context in
which those actors are embedded while making
decisions and a sensitivity for the perception of that
context by the employees. The successful manage-
ment of conflicts of interest has to include (at least)
the following aspects:
(1) Potential delinquents who have a predisposi-
tion for deviant behavior have to be kept in
check.
(2) Reward systems and leadership behavior
should not promote deviant behavior of
otherwise good employees.
(3) The rules of the game must be clear and
there should be no (intentional or uninten-
tional) normative ambivalence between offi-
cial societal norms and informal
organizational counternorms.
Fighting legal and ethical misconduct
The following sub-sections briefly touch on three
prominent remedies (see Boatright, 2000 and
Crockett et al., 2004), market discipline, disclosure,
and market conduct rules (self-imposed or by gov-
ernment regulation). Stating the limits of a merely
compliance-driven approach to conflicts of interest,
we additionally discuss integrity-driven activities,
which corporations in the financial industry might
adopt or strengthen.
Competition and market discipline
Competition among providers of financial inter-
mediation helps in avoiding conflict of interest as
it increases clients’ bargaining power. However,
though this is true in the standard principal agent
setting (where many agents compete for the
attention of one principal), it does not necessarily
respond to the above-described concrete decision-
making situations with more than one principal. In
these situations, principals compete for the atten-
tion of the agent. Besides, competition among
agents remains limited. Though, for instance, in
the case of broker commissions, increasing com-
petition is related to reduced (transaction) fees, in
many cases the missing transparency of structures
prevents workable competition and weakens the
disciplinary power of the market. An example is
the opaque cost structure of mutual funds. Fur-
thermore, cost structures of competing mutual
funds are difficult to compare. Thus, cost struc-
tures are not clear to the clients who might not be
able to choose the best service. As we have seen
in the case of soft commissions, it might even lead
to perverted outcomes, where the competitive
pressure provokes the agents to increase the cli-
ent’s disorientation and thus creates additional
room for conflicts of interest.
Disclosure
Market discipline visibly is not sufficient to man-
age conflicts of interest as demonstrated above.
This points toward the important role of disclosing
possible and actual conflicts of interest. By making
colliding interests known to their clients and dis-
closing internal structures (as cost structures and
compensation schemes), financial intermediaries
can take a proactive stance in avoiding conflicts of
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interest. However, even voluntary disclosure is not
sufficient. On the one hand, many investors are
not well informed nor interested in particulars.
This could result in an inability to understand the
significance of disclosed fields of tension. On the
other hand, and this is even more probable, only a
few firms would be prepared to take this proactive
stance, fearing competitive disadvantages compared
to other intermediaries that remain silent about
potential conflicts. In addition, many actors lack
moral motivation. As we have seen, it is quite easy
in many cases to tell whether a behavior is ade-
quate or inadequate (which does not necessarily
mean illegal). However, some intermediaries
actually seem to specialize on exploiting regulatory
loopholes and acting in gray areas. Depending on
the goodwill of financial intermediaries apparently
is not enough.
Market conduct rules and regulation
To create a level playing field, disclosure should
be made mandatory for all market participants.
Increased transparency can result from industry
self-regulation or government legislature. In most
countries, this is done in a two layer system: self-
regulation institutions that are overseen by the
state. Apart from rendering disclosure obligatory,
regulation has an important role in setting stan-
dards but also must be endowed with power to
enforce its principles. The heaviest form of gov-
ernment regulation is to mandate structural re-
forms. In the U.S., this was first introduced by the
1933 Banking Act (also known as Glass-Steagall
Act), which separated commercial banks from
investment banks/brokerages to reduce conflicts of
interest. Recently, in the U.S., separatist tenden-
cies have been reinforced by the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, a counterreaction to what Stiglitz
(2003, p. 87) terms the ‘deregulation run amok’
experience of financial sector liberalization in the
U.S. in the 1990s which culminated in the
Financial Services Modernization Act (also known
as Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) which repelled the
structural barriers of the Banking Act as it permits
banks, securities firms and insurance companies to
affiliate under the structure of a financial holding
company (Crockett et al., 2004). Sarbanes-Oxley,
though mainly concerned with auditing practices,
prescribes an internal separation – a Chinese wall –
between research and investment banking activities
and thus reimposes structural separation between
these activities (Section 501 Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
However, claims that the provisions of Sarbanes-
Oxley impede the efficiency of financial interme-
diation and disadvantage the U.S. as a financial
center amount, which already led to a revision of
implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley based legisla-
tion and regulation and may lead to a further
weakening of the Act (Wighton, 2007). Overall,
the effectiveness of the Act in preventing future
market misbehavior is questionable (Whalen, 2003)
as it addresses only some of the relevant concerns
(Suchan, 2004). Nevertheless, it is difficult for
governments to regulate financial intermediation in
a proactive way. Banner (1997) shows that over
the last 300 years of Anglo-American securities
regulation often was the result of major crises, and
thus reactive. Similarly, in the current time of
heightened financial globalization, domestic regu-
latory bodies and legislation struggle to effectively
regulate transnational corporations (Scherer et al.,
2006). Furthermore, even in situations where the
exploitation of conflicts of interest is clearly illegal,
it does happen, not only in small firms, but in
some of the industry’s biggest players as demon-
strated in the above-discussed examples. Thus, the
main responsibility in providing a viable financial
system still lies with financial intermediaries
themselves. A corporate culture has to be estab-
lished that makes the exploitation of conflicts of
interest normatively unacceptable.
Integrity programs
There are no ready-made remedies for each type
of conflict of interest. Obviously, only a combi-
nation of mechanisms can sufficiently deal with
them. Given the above outlined various driving
forces of conflicts of interest, coercive control via
laws, market mechanisms, and internal codes can
only be part of the answer. In fact, these remedies
might help to keep in check some forms of
criminal behavior but blind out or even para-
doxically provoke other forms. Coercive control
might for instance lead to an atrophy of compe-
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tence and thereby increase the ambivalence of the
decision-making (Stansbury and Barry, 2007). An
overly focus on structural remedies might provoke an
underestimation of psychological factors that drive
the actors’ perception of their situation, the role of
leadership example or the relevance of individual
ethical empowerment. Paine (1995) has pointed to
the limits of a merely law and control-driven
ethics program (compliance) and proposed a value-
based approach that rather builds upon creating
and fostering a moral climate of shared values
(integrity). The idea behind her proposal is the
assumption that intrinsically motivated employees
might show a more stable and calculable behavior
than those employees who are trained to follow
legal demands and who feel threatened by sanc-
tions. Explicit incentives or sanctions can even
lead to an erosion of the moral climate, e.g., by
reducing the level of mutual trust (Frey, 1997).
Distrust toward employees that is displayed in
sophisticated control and monitoring mechanisms
can become self-fulfilling and provoke the very
behavior the mechanisms seek to prevent (Ghoshal
and Moran, 1996). Integrity programs are strongly
linked to the example and commitment of top
management (Weaver et al., 1999). Integrity does
not replace compliance but strengthens its effects.
‘‘Case-based research and theoretical research have
suggested that value-oriented programs or com-
bined values and compliance programs should be
more effective’’ (Weaver et al., 1999, p. 55).
A wide range of conflicts of interest exists in the
contractual relationships of financial intermediation.
Principal-agent theory and its modifications provide
a relatively good analytical tool to explain the
underlying tensions and to classify the conflicts that
arise. However, there is no standard solution to these
problems and regulatory tools are consequently di-
verse. More research has to be carried out to better
tailor regulation. Nevertheless, the actors involved in
financial intermediation themselves have to act to
reduce the potential for conflicts. On the one hand
this implies that investors should not blindly trust
their agents or, even worse, allow for shady practices
as long as the gain is sufficient. It has been very
characteristic that most of the scandals have erupted
after markets have gone down. On the other hand,
financial intermediaries should be fully aware of their
special trust position. Accordingly, organizations – as
well as the individuals in them – should act with the
necessary due diligence and take a proactive role in
managing conflict.5
Notes
1. Thielemann and Ulrich´s (2003) extensive discussion
of non-contractual problems is due to the fact that they
analyse the Swiss financial industry with its specifics such
as bank secrecy and the non-criminaliation of tax evasion.
2. At least not regarding the funding decision. How-
ever, institutional investors are becoming increasingly
salient shareholder activists.
3. In some countries the fund management is indepen-
dent from the company which sells the shares – acting
purely in an oversight role – as trust and management
function are separated by the law (Carmichael and
Pomerleano, 2002).
4. However, deviating slightly from Boatright’s taxon-
omy, we would argue that actual impersonal conflicts do
not preclude that individual or organizational actors are also
driven by personal gains. This becomes especially relevant
in the transition from potential to actual conflict of interest.
5. Both authors contributed equally.
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